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Furthermore the ideals of the good, the true, and the beautiful 
must be, for Haeckel, purely human ideals, since no values exist 
for the universe. But if man himself has as little value as Haeckel 
gives him, it is strange that he should regard human ideals as worthy 
of reverence and worship. 
A final word must be added to our criticism of mechanism. 
The theory of mechanism itself is not, as Haeckel must believe, a 
purely natural product. It is due to the organizing activity of man's 
intelligence and could not exist without it. Haeckel regards this 
unifying and critical faculty of man as due to the "concatenation 
of presentations."23 Yet the mere concatenation of presentations 
could never of itself lead to the criticism and combination necessary 
to bind together these various sensations under the law of causa-
tion. This unifying of experience demands, as Eucken has so clearly 
shown, that man be able to separate himself from the chain of na-
ture in order to combine and order the presentations that come to 
him. Hence the formulation of the theory of mechanism is a fact 
which mechanism itself fails to explain, and the very existence of 
the theory is evidence of its own inadequacy as a final explanation of 
all facts in the universe. 
Our examination of Haeckel's philosophy has shown the lack 
of cogency of his denial of freedom. While this in itself furnishes 
no evidence for the reality of freedom, it at least frees us from many 
objections that are commonly raised against it. It indicates that the 
problem cannot be disposed of in so summary a manner by science, 
and thus affords ground for those who in the twentieth century, 
in spite of Haeckel's dictum, maintain the possibility of freedom. 
GERTRUDE CARMAN BUSSEY. 
GOUCHER COLLEGE, BALTIMORE, MD. 
DETERMINISM OF FREE WILL. 
WITH REFERENCE TO THE PRECEDING ARTICLE. 
There is a strange confusion about mechanicalism and freedom 
of will which seems to have been constructed by our theological 
school of educators on the basis of a misinterpretation of philo-
sophical thought, and errors thus derived are still perpetuated. 
The idea of the will is perhaps the fundamental conception of 
*» Cf. The Riddle of the Universe, pp. 121 f. 
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ethics, and an important item for moral purposes is the freedom of 
an acting person. But "free will" is nothing mysterious nor in-
credible ; it is that condition of a will which is not hindered by com-
pulsion. He is free who acts on his own account, according to his 
own character, and is not interfered with by external circumstances 
which would make it impossible for him to act as he wishes. A man 
under compulsion is not responsible for his action; for his act is 
the act of some one else, or is due to the circumstances which force 
him against his own will. The external circumstances may be ever 
so indirect and may be reducible to fear. A man threatened by the 
consequences of the results of his act is no freer than a man who 
is directly forced into acting contrary to his will by facing the re-
volver of a highway robber. If an act is committed because the 
acting person wishes the act and also willingly accepts all of its 
consequences, it is and ought to be considered an act of free will, 
and there is scarcely any thinker who would not admit this definition 
of free will. 
Is there any one who denies that the act of a free will, as here 
defined, is as much determined as any other event in this world in 
which we live? If the free act of a man is really the result of de-
liberation and if it is performed according to the nature of the 
actor's character, the result of this decision will be as necessary as 
the act of an unfree man who acts under compulsion according to 
motives of fear or any external force. Determinism is a general 
feature of the world which expresses the truth that the law of 
causation remains unbroken. According to the law of causation, 
everything is determined, even the act of a free man. 
Yet there are, or rather have been, some theologians who believe 
in free will, not as free will necessarily must be, viz., an unhampered 
will, but as a carte blanche or tabula rasa, a cause that is not caused, 
or as a determinant which on its part is undetermined, which is 
free in the sense that it is unformed, or a factor that is somehow 
an exception to causation and not the product of the efficacy of 
causation. They think that a man is not responsible if his actions 
are determined or determinable and can be predicted, just as in 
moving pictures only such consequences will happen as are on the 
films, and the man who knows the film would naturally and neces-
sarily be able to tell what is going to happen in the next moment. 
What an undetermined will is or would be, has never as yet been 
clearly described; it is only declared to be an exception to the law 
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of causality, and being undetermined seems to be as much a mere 
chance product as the haphazard cast of dies, in which case of 
course the actor could no longer be regarded as responsible for a 
deed not determined by himself. 
The truth is that if we were omniscient we could predict the 
history of the world from step to step just as the theatrical man-
ager of the movies knows the next act if he knows the film that is 
to project it on the screen. If I know all the characters of the 
acting persons, I will be able to predict the outcome of their activ-
ity under definite conditions, and there can be no quibbling about it. 
We must not identify necessity and compulsion. Everything 
is determined; and all acts are determined with necessity, even the 
free acts of a free man. Further it would be wrong to say that 
man is compelled to act according to factors which are none of his 
making, if he necessarily acts according to his will. 
It is true that there are factors which have preceded him; 
among them there are factors such as have determined his char-
acter. He has been determined and his will has been given him. 
In this sense it is claimed that he is as unfree as any slave who is 
not his own master. But is that not a wrong conclusion that here 
too identifies necessity with compulsion? It is necessary that a 
man should act according to his character if he is not under com-
pulsion. The acts of a free man are necessary because his will 
necessarily and naturally follows the impulses of his own character. 
To say that we are slaves because we follow necessarily our own 
instincts is simply an illogical distortion of facts. The truth is that 
in doing what we will we obey the behest of those factors which 
shaped our will. However, granting that our will is not of our own 
making, we will be obliged to confess that we are the continuation 
of those factors which make us; or in other words, our ancestors 
whose will we incorporate are ourselves in a former generation. 
Thus we ought to recognize openly and unhesitatingly that the 
whole development of the world is not a piecing together of inde-
pendent individuals, but that we are mere fragments of a continuous 
whole, we are pieces of a prolonged history of one and the same 
aspiration which may be modified, improved, or even on the other 
hand weakened and debased. Former generations have made us 
of the present age, and future generations will be as much the 
product of the present generation as we are of the past. Thus 
if we speak of having been made by prior factors we must recognize 
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that the factors that made us are our own existence, as we existed 
in former days,—yet the truth remains that a free will is definitely 
determined. A free will which acts in an unhampered way is as 
much determined as any will which suffers violence or acts under 
compulsion. 
Miss Bussey has taken up Haeckel and criticizes him for de-
nying freedom of will where he stands up for determinism. I do 
not think that Professor Haeckel will take up the cudgel and defend 
himself. On the other hand I grant that Professor Haeckel is an 
enthusiastic defender of the monistic world-conception for which 
he demands a strict and universal application of the mechanistic 
theory to all events of existence. I will not deny that Professor 
Haeckel sometimes accepts views which I myself would not endorse. 
For instance he identifies God with matter and energy while I would 
look upon God in contrast to matter and energy, as a religious 
formulation of the world order which is the ultimate raison d'etre 
of natural law throughout the sphere of existence, including also 
the natural law that governs human society and is the basis of the 
rules of conduct. But this is a point which could easily be recon-
structed or altered, for Professor Haeckel himself would scarcely 
object to it. 
In order to understand Haeckel one ought to interpret his 
writings in the spirit in which he has written them, and ought not 
imply mistakes which are rather incidental points, such as Miss 
Bussey criticizes. 
Miss Bussey in criticizing Professor Haeckel should consider 
that he rejects the theory of free will because he understands by free 
will the theological conception of an undetermined will, viz., that 
kind of a free will that does not exist, because it is a self-contradic-
tory notion, an impossible and foolish conception of a misguided 
brain. If he rejects it he does so only in the sense in which theo-
logians have misrepresented freedom of will as being exempt from 
the law of causation. And in doing so he is certainly right in the 
face of Miss Bussey or any one who believes in a freedom of that 
kind, proclaiming that it is independent of causation. 
There is no need of entering into the details of Miss Bussey's 
discussion. Any of our readers who knows Haeckel will be able 
to form his own judgment. Only a few points shall be mentioned 
here. 
The universe has certainly to be explained from the highest 
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product its development achieves and not from its lowest beginnings. 
It is man that gives us the key to the appearance of the moner, 
while the moner will not be able to tell what its evolution will bring 
out in the end. On the other hand we have not solved the problem 
unless we trace the development of a rational being step by step 
in a mechanistic fashion of cause and effect. To deny it would 
mean to abolish science in spots. I prefer to keep my trust in 
science, for science to me is God's revelation. The most important 
step for instance is the development of reason, and it has been ex-
plained in a mechanistic sense by Ludwig Noire when he shows how 
the origin of language has produced reason and not the reverse; or, 
to express his principle in a popular way, "We think because we 
speak" and not "we speak because we think." The mechan-
ical mechanism of speech came first, and it was the mechanism of 
logic and grammar which has enabled us to think. 
It is not a fault of Haeckel's if he holds the view that man 
explains the nature and significance of the moner. It proves that 
he is not onesided. His claim is but the natural consequence of a 
consideration of evolution. 
The law of the conservation of matter and energy is an a priori 
law, which in its general meaning is similar to mathematical postu-
lates. It is a demand of science and need not be proved in detail. 
It is a pre-supposition just as much as is the law of causation 
which the scientist assumes when he investigates natural phenom-
ena. That there is a purpose in the universe is a proposition which 
would involve a belief that the universe as a whole is to be under-
stood as an individual personal being after the fashion of a man. 
It would involve an anthropomorphic conception of God, and I 
doubt whether even among our theologians there are now many 
bold enough to take such a position. This, however, does not ex-
clude that the universe in its processes follows a definite direction, 
a claim which is proved by the facts of evolution and is probably 
not denied by either a theistic or atheistic interpretation of the 
word. 
Why the formulation of the theory of mechanicalism should 
be a fact which mechanicalism itself fails to explain is unintelligible, 
and why its own existence should be evidence of its own inadequacy 
is hard to understand, unless the notion of mechanicalism be nar-
rowed to a limited field which does not include the entire construe-
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tion of mechanicalism and its internal interrelations, such as for 
instance the interrelations of logical rules and conditions. 
We may be able to uphold the theory of free will but we shall 
certainly not be able to deny the principle of determinism, and this 
is a blessing for the ethicist who preaches morality and claims that 
the freedom of will is essential for it, because if free will were 
indeed an exception to the law of causation and the will were unde-
termined and not changeable by education but remained a tabula 
rasa in spite of all attempts to change and improve it, or make it 
definite in the right direction, what would be the use of wasting our 
energies in promoting the welfare of mankind and eliminating evil 
influences? Let us be glad that determinism is true, for otherwise 
there would be no science, and principles of conduct would be a 
meaningless play of a misguided and erring imagination. 
Haeckel apparently commits a very grave mistake. His opin-
ions are "the result of the general presuppositions and prejudices of 
the age." He and many others "believe whatever fits in with their 
view of life and dismiss without a hearing anything which conflicts 
with it." Miss Bussey claims that "in this age of science the scien-
tist has become the arbiter of all questions, and his view is com-
monly accepted as authoritative." In other words, we expect that 
science shall solve our problems, and we are prejudiced enough to 
bow down before science and accept its verdict. Haeckel for in-
stance is so prejudiced that he believes in the universality of natural 
laws, and, says Miss Bussey, "It is a philosophic commonplace that 
laws resting on experience can be universalized only by means of 
the supposition of the uniformity of nature." It is a pity that 
Haeckel follows this fallacy and accepts the uniformity of nature, 
but the worst is that I too plead guilty. I believe not only in his 
"supposition of the uniformity of nature," but also in science with 
all that it implies, especially determinism which demands the de-
terminedness of everything, even the determinedness of an unham-
pered and, in this sense, free will. I can not help it. I am in the 
same predicament as Professor Haeckel. May God have mercy on 
our souls! EDITOR. 
T H E BELIEF IN GOD AND IMMORTALITY. 
Professor James H. Leuba, professor psychology and peda-
gogy in Bryn Mawr College, has undertaken to write a book on 
The Belief in God and Immortality. It is not a proof or disproof 
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